29.01.2009
Russian Opposition Politics
in a Time of CrisisRussian opposition parties and politicians became more vocal and active as the global economic crisis hit Russia. While it's died down some, here's how the Russian media has reported on the phenomenon and the parties. Russians fear economic crisis more than democratic freedom restrictions - poll MOSCOW. Jan 23 (Interfax) - Russians see the deepening economic crisis, unemployment and price growth as the main threats facing the country, shows a poll conducted by the Levada Center on January 16-19.The respondents said these problems are threatening Russian citizens 40% more than they did a year ago due to the economic crisis, shows the poll. The only exception is the issue of inflation, which has concerned Russians for the past few years (50-55% of the respondents said they are concerned about the rising inflation). A study conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research center (VTsIOM) said the top problems seen by Russians as the main threats are inflation and growing prices (61%). However, this year the majority of the respondents also mentioned unemployment (61% against 25% last year). Among other top threats seen by Russians are rising crime (23%), conflicts with the neighboring countries or the CIS countries (13%), the poll conducted by Levada Center has shown. The third threat on the VTsIOM threats rating is alcoholism and drug abuse (53%). They are followed by corruption and bureaucracy (41%), living standards (32%), crime and the situation in healthcare (31% each), pensions (29%), the situation in the housing and utilities sector (24%), the economic crisis and the situation of the youth (23% each). Among the less probable threats the respondents polled by Levada Center mentioned the authorities' arbitrariness and Russia's involvement in military conflicts abroad (8% each), Russia's increasing dependence on the West and the government's incompetence (7% each), the plundering of the national resources by foreigners (6%), the division of the country into regions and the aggravation of the situation in the Northern Caucasus (5% each). Plan of Action To Surmount Financial Crisis Proposed by Opposition Figures Vedomosti, January 23, 2009 Statement by opposition figures and former officials -- Mikhail Gorbachev, USSR president; Aleksandr Lebedev, president of the National Reserve Corporation; Vladimir Ryzhkov, Russian Federation State Duma deputy, 1st-4th convocation; Vladislav Inozemtsev, publisher of Free Thought magazine; Sergey Aleksashenko: "An Anti-Crisis Strategy: Surmounting the Crisis Together" The crisis that began with financial upheavals in the United States became a world-wide crisis towards the end of 2008 and today constitutes a test of strength of the economic models that have taken shape in various countries over the past 10 years. Russian authorities are trying to act in accordance with formulas applied in various countries: allocating funds for recapitalization of the banking system, declaring a reduction of the tax burden for enterprises, acquiring problem assets, and providing elective support to certain sectors of the economy. But all these measures are being carried out slowly, without transparency, and are often proving to be ineffective. Resources are being directed not so much towards protecting the interests of the majority of citizens of Russia as towards salvaging the assets and titles of ownership of a narrow circle of influential businessmen. We consider it necessary, given this situation, to issue a statement on the establishment of a Public Anti-Crisis Initiative aimed at uniting all those who believe that it is the principal task of a responsible government to protect Russian citizens from the negative consequences of the crisis. We are opposed to measures that would lead to a lowered standard of living of citizens. We are opposed to transferring the burden of the crisis from the oligarchs to ordinary individuals. We support efforts to fight trends leading to devaluation of the ruble. We support a consistent struggle against inflation and the elaboration of measures aimed at reducing the outflow of capital from the country. We believe that representatives of business and the authority must bear responsibility for their mistakes. We assert that in recent years: Russian authorities have rejected structural transformations and have contented themselves with the invention of a mythical model of an "energy superpower"; consolidation of the role of the state has evolved into a suppression of private initiative, a moderate re-nationalization of key sectors, and the growth of monopoly tendencies; saturation of the budget with raw material revenues has increased ineffective state outlays, encouraging corruption and a distorted "recoil economy"; a prohibitive regime for direct foreign investments and super-attractive conditions for the investment of speculation capital has been established in Russia; state agencies have totally failed to react to the rapid growth of corporate foreign loans and deterioration of the quality of obligations; speculative growth of the economy "blew bubbles" in the stock market and real estate market under "private control" of the bureaucracy; limitations of democracy and political competition made it extremely difficult to promote a free rivalry of ideas and concepts for development of the country. We assert that the situation that has taken shape in the Russian economy is extraordinary. The government still possesses resources, but the crisis is growing stronger. Industrial production is diminishing. Numbers of unemployed are increasing. Real income of the populace is decreasing. We believe that the situation can be corrected and we propose the following measures: 1. Rejection of the elective refinancing of foreign debts of Russian corporations. A transfer to creditors, including foreign creditors, of the share packages of debtor companies will ensure the flow of capital into the country and -- in the long run -- will enhance transparency and the operational effectiveness of these companies. The assets of oligarchs must not be rescued at the expense of the taxpayers. 2. Corporate foreign indebtedness must be converted into sovereign debt on a uniform basis through a system of auctions at which foreign creditors might replace corporate debts for Russian Federation Eurobonds with redemption in 2020-2025. This measure would save the country's gold currency reserves, free up significant assets for current tasks, and render unnecessary the support of 150-300 "worst companies" that might not be salvageable when put to the test. 3. There must be a shift to a predictable exchange rate policy, directing saved reserves to support of the ruble exchange rate during the entire critical phase of the crisis. This will help fight inflation, preserve investments of the populace in banks, and stabilize the financial system. Subsequently, as the country emerges from the crisis, the principle of exchange rate stability may be replaced by absolute predictability of its dynamics. 4. Consistent efforts must be made to fight inflation. We believe that given today's conditions, there is no objective basis for continued high inflation, except for ineffectiveness in the use of budget assets, corruption of the state apparatus, and the continued monopolization of most sectors of the economy. 5. The rates charged by the natural monopolies must be frozen. Decisions on the substantive increase effective 1 January 2009 in the price of gas and electricity, as well as transportation and municipal services, must be repealed since the major energy and transportation companies are capable of surmounting the crisis by reducing expenditures and rejecting non-profile assets. 6. The financial and banking systems must be strengthened, encouraging the consolidation of banks, developing a system of guarantees for interbank credits to revive the interbank credits market, repealing the practice of unjustified preferences for state banks, and legislatively restricting margin in the crediting of enterprises and citizens. A thorough audit of "systemic" banks must be conducted by auditing organizations engaged by oversight agencies and compensated by them. 7. Liquidity must continue to be injected into the domestic market by providing support to citizens. For individuals who have lost their jobs or a significant portion of income, up to 20,000 rubles (R) of the amount of consumer and other credits they received prior to 1 July 2008 should be written off. The state must subsidize payments on mortgage credits, beginning with a 10 percent annual interest rate in rubles. Funds required to do this should be allocated from the national welfare fund. 8. A system of insurance must be introduced in the event of job loss. This system must be capable of compensating for at least 70 percent of lost earnings over the course of the nine months following discharge from the job in question, for employees whose salary did not exceed R30,000. This system is to be applied only to individuals discharged by virtue of downsizing related to a firm's reorganization. 9. An energetic anti-monopoly policy must be implemented, recognizing that development of the Russian economy is impossible given the degree of monopolization that has been imposed by actions of the state (including during the course of establishment of "state corporations"). We propose that a package of basic anti-monopoly measures be fully implemented prior to 1 July 2009 -- measures prescribed in the "acquis communautaire" of the European Union. 10. Outlays of the Russian Federation federal budget and territorial budgets in 2009 should be curtailed by at least 15 percent of the 2008 level, primarily the outlays for state government. The numbers of employees in state government agencies should be reduced by at least 25 percent by the end of 2009. A total moratorium should be introduced on pay raises for these employees over the period 2009-2010. 11. Deep structural reforms must be carried out in all systemic sectors without exception. The Russian auto industry will be rescued not by customs duties, which hit the pocketbooks of Russian citizens, but by competition and privatization. The state monopoly over airline transportation will not replace the competitive private sector. An urgent program of individual accessible housing must begin to be implemented in the construction sphere. 12. Tax holidays should be declared. Taxes on dividends and bank deposit interest should be repealed. Enterprises with up to 10 employees should be totally exempted from taxes and audits for a period of at least two years. The level of turnover of companies relating to juridical persons with the right of preferential taxation should be increased to R100 million. 13. A transparent system of competitive bidding should be developed and introduced prior to 1 July 2009 for determining the contractors and suppliers of goods and services to meet the needs of the state and companies in whose capital the Russian Federation and state companies participate to the extent of at least 30 percent. All Russian and foreign companies that express an interest in this regard must be permitted to freely participate in this bidding process. 14. The current leaders of companies and banks receiving state financial support should be immediately removed from their leadership positions. An inspection should be conducted of the activity of all managers of state companies and banks appointed to their positions prior to 1 January 2008. Reports on the financial condition of these companies are to be rendered on a monthly basis in the State Duma. 15. Measures of anti-corruption policy must be made tougher. We propose that current bodies of authority and all concerned state structures, social organizations, and business representatives unite their efforts in elaborating an optimal and effective program to counter crisis phenomena in the interests of Russian citizens. The time has come to rid ourselves of negative traits that were accumulated in the Russian economy in 2000-2008 and set Russia on the path of democracy, industrial modernization, and stable development. Mikhail Gorbachev, USSR president; Aleksandr Lebedev, president of the National Reserve Corporation; Vladimir Ryzhkov, deputy of the Russian Federation State Duma, 1st-4th convocation; Vladislav Inozemtsev, publisher of Free Thought magazine; Sergey Aleksashenko, first deputy (as published; source text ends here). Russian Communists Suggest Their Own Way Out Of The Crisis MOSCOW, December 17 (Itar-Tass) -- Russia has fallen victim to the world financial crisis mostly due to the liberal reforms carried out in the country of late, claims the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. "Russia's revival will be possible only through the rejection of the alien liberal model," the presidium of the CPRF Central Committee said in a statement on Wednesday. It also published a list of proposed measures for easing the effects of the crisis. In part, the Communists demand the withdrawal of Russian assets from Western banks, the establishment of direct government control of the banking sphere, minimization of the stock market, the encouragement of domestic demand by raising wages and social benefits, a stop to the growth of prices of essentials, housing and utilities services and energy resources, and diversification of external trade, which, they claim, is too dependent on the West. Also, they urge the maximum financial support for small businesses, which would help fill the market with goods of domestic manufacture and phase out imports. In the meantime, the United Russia party earlier suggested basically the same measures. Its social-conservative club argues that greater internal demand and state protectionism would help fight the crisis. "In peace time we are supporters of the most open economy and the minimum government intervention, but we are in the context of a crisis, when it is the duty and obligation of the state to protect its economy to protect its economy and its
citizens," said the club's coordinator, Andrei Isayev. The social-conservative wing of the United Russia party believes that in the current condition, despite the inflation risks growth in people's incomes should be guaranteed to the maximum extent." Amid the crisis, one is forced to choose between inflation and unemployment. The choice should be in favor of inflation," Isayev said.
Almost Two-thirds Of Russians Say Communist Symbols Should Be Preserved MOSCOW, December 27 (Itar-Tass) -- Almost two-thirds of Russians believe that communists symbols in the names of streets and squares, the hammer and the sickle, monuments, etc., should be preserved as history. One in five Russians (20 percent) polled by the All-Russia Public Opinion Centre (VTsIOM) says that communist symbols are relics of the past and need to be disposed of. Only 5 percent of respondents believe that they should be restored. Ten percent were undecided. Fifty-nine percent of those polled want the streets and squares named after communist leaders or activists to retain their names as part of history. One in four respondents (25 percent) insists that they should regain their original names. Four percent believe that the streets and squares that have regained their original names should be given communist names again. Twelve percent were undecided. More than half of respondents - 60 percent - think that the monuments to communists leaders and activists should not be demolished, 12 percent suggest relocating these monuments, 8 percent say such monuments have to be pulled down, and 8 percent insist that the demolished monuments should be restored,. The rest were undecided. The nationwide poll was conducted by VTsIOM on November 8-9. It involved 1,600 people in 140 towns and settlements in 42 regions. The margin of error did not exceed 3.4 percent. Unlikely That Crisis Will Force Regime Course Change MOSCOW, December 30, 2008 (Grani.ru) - Commentary by Irina Pavlova: "Pure Illusion" It is hard to understand the root of the optimism of liberal experts, who expect that the result of the crisis will be a cleansing of the economic, political and social situation in the country. Why are they so sure that Russia is subordinate "to the same regularities, is subject to the same diseases as all other capitalist countries," that "the present-day economic cataclysms do not leave the ruling regime any hope for a favorable outcome," that "in any case, the coming year will become a year of a new political agenda and a new power mandate." Of course, such factors as the decline in oil prices, the recent protest demonstrations in a number of cities throughout the country, and the active discussion of economic problems -- after it was supremely allowed to use the word, "crisis," as applied to Russia -- all played their role here. However, we should not flatter ourselves: The authorities are specifically the ones who, as usual, run the show. They may prohibit talking about the crisis, or they may initiate its broad discussion. Recently, representatives of the ruling party - the social-conservative club of United Russia, the liberal-conservative club of "4 November," and the state-patriotic club - proposed their recommendations for emerging from the crisis. The so-called Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR), which is considered to be Dmitriy Medvedev's "think tank," worked for several months, and as a result proposed a new concept for development of the country's political system. In the opinion of its experts, the need for urgent liberalization is coming - moreover, at the initiative of the ruling leadership. Only in this way, in their opinion, can unrest in the country during the period of crisis be avoided. All this works fully well toward the image of a "sovereign democracy." Well, and what if we try to understand what is really going on? Then we will have to admit that, first of all, this informational noise is entirely harmless to the ruling regime and in no way influences decision-making in the country. In fact, this is misinformation employed as technique of rule, because experts, as a rule, do not touch upon the essence of the problem. If a discussion of the crisis has demonstrated anything, it is the acute shortage of understanding of the very phenomenon of the new Russian economy. What is needed in order to explain this "unique animal" is not concepts from Western economic science, in which Russian economists deftly operate and which do not work here, but concepts that describe a mafia economy - moreover, with a Russian specific. Consequently, the recipes that are suitable for treating the economies of Western countries are also inapplicable to the Russian criminal-market economy. To start with, we should bring the Russian economy out of the shadows. However, the Kremlin, which has privatized it in the interests of its own corporations, is certainly not interested in this. And so, everything follows its own course:
When the matter concerns the country, some kind of blind decisions are adopted, just in case they might work. But when the interests affect the ruling leadership, the decisions are entirely consciousones. Secondly, understanding the nature of the present-day Russian authorities and the mechanism of their action, it is hard to imagine that they would voluntarily agree to the urgent liberalization that is being proposed by experts.
In the late 1980's - early 1990's, the communist nomenklatura opted for this step in order to legalize the re-division of property, which had secretly already taken place in the depths of the socialist economy during the times of the so-called stagnation. However, at that time they were unable to bring the superstructure into correspondence with the new base right away. Yet they have fully managed to correct this non-correspondence in recent years. We might add that the campaign to discredit the "wild 90's" consisted of that same misinformation, aimed at disorienting public opinion. The Putin regime artificially incited enmity toward the so-called oligarchs, manipulating the discontent of the people and using their feelings to achieve its own goals- specifically, for the purpose of eliminating its enemies. While condemning the 1990's, the authorities nevertheless did nothing to review the unjust results of privatization. On the contrary, they became its biggest beneficiary, including at the expense of the plundered YUKOS company. They also did not do anything to prevent the flight of capital from the country. Otherwise, conditions would have been worked out, under which property remained in the hands of its current owners with the legal rights of "private"
property, and not some kind of overblown private property, which it is today. In that case, the owners would have had to give up part of their unlawfully acquired property, handing it over to the state fund for needs of developing society (or to pay its value). However, the property which they would have retained would have been legitimized, and this would have allowed its owners to become independent of the supreme authorities, not fearing, not fleeing the country, but working toward its development. However, the present-day authorities prefer to control today's wealthy by other methods, using other mechanisms to exert pressure on them and to ensure thei rco-participation in matters. If the current regime were really interested in development of the country, and not in strengthening its own power, then, recalling the lessons of history, it would be acting in accordance with the simple but extremely important truth, formulated back at the beginning of the 20th Century by Count Sergey Vitte: "Woe be to that country, which has not instilled in its population a sense of legality and property, but, on the contrary, imposed some sort of collective ownership." But in this case too, the incumbent authorities did not obligate public officials to fulfill the laws that ensure the development and protection of private property, and did not create conditions under which business could have emerged from the shadows. In short, despite the liberal rhetoric, it did not lay the foundation for a legal state, but on the contrary, hindered its emergence. Yet there was a probability that, under conditions of existence of open and protected business, not a mythical, but a real middle class could have emerged on Russian soil after a certain time, with its own view of its own country, and one which would have needed its own representatives in parliament and a party that expressed its own interest. As a result, the people would have come to liberal, European values on their own, through their own experience. Then, this new generation of Russians would also have begun to perceive the history of their country differently, including that of its Stalinist period. Yet all these years, the policy of the Russian authorities had a different vector of development. Its present-day representatives had a different upbringing, a different view of the world, different ideals and different historical heroes. And for that reason, in order to understand how these authorities are acting, we must look not at the rhetoric and not at the noisy campaigns of misinformation that are organized at the top, but at those of their decisions which, despite all their secrecy, partially come to the surface. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn presents a wonderful metaphor in this regard in his "Cancer Ward:" "The life that was visible to all - production, conferences, large-circulation publications, local committee announcements, visa application forms, the dining hall, the club - was not real, but only seemed so to the unenlightened. Yet the real direction of life was decided without shouting, calmly, in quiet offices, between two or three people that understood each other or by a quiet phone call. Real life still streams in secret papers, deep in the briefcases of Rusanov and his associates. And it could quietly follow a person for a long time - and only suddenly show itself for a moment, show its teeth and belch fire at its victim - and then again disappear back to who knows where. But on the surface, all the same things remained: The club, the dining hall, the visa application, the large-circulation publication, the production..." What is it in such actions of the authorities that has come to the surface today? Not so little: This is the state defense contract for 2009-2011, which has been approved by the government, and which was first developed not by Minekonomrazvitiye (Ministry of Economic Development), but by a government military-industrial commission. This is the "Strategy of National Security of Russia to the Year 2020," whose ratification is planned at an expanded session of the Security Council with participation of the President of Russia on 20 February 2009. These are the measures aimed at stopping the troop reductions in the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and bolstering of the special services. The limitation of jury trials and the expansion of the interpretation of articles of the Criminal Code on state treason, espionage and divulging state secrets... In short, there is nothing unexpected: The regular process of continued strengthening of the incumbent authorities within the country and expanding its influence on the international arena is underway. How specifically this will happen will become clear in the New Year, 2009. Russian Parties Get More Active, New Emerge, As Crisis Goes On MOSCOW, December 1 (Itar-Tass) -- As the financial crisis in Russia gains strength, various political forces in Russia have gone more active, and many of them are obviously in the mood of using the forecast public discontent to score political points. In the meantime, the emergence of more political parties has continued on the left- and right-hand side of the political spectrum, and this process, as political analysts say, is orchestrated from the Kremlin. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation held its 13th congress last weekend, which indicated that the oldest political party in the country has no intention of changing itself to any significant extent (at least, in personnel terms), or to cede positions. On the contrary, the Communists made no secret they would benefit from the crisis, because it might help them regain influence in society. 'A turn for the left' is not a long way down the road, they warned, but at the same time they promised not to whip up tensions. The Communists' invariable leader, Gennady Zyuganov, was re-elected again, although President Dmitry Medvedev in his state-of-the nation address to the Federal Assembly on November 5 said he would like to see periodical personnel rotation of senior party functionaries. In part, the very same person, he said, would be unable to hold a certain post in the party's leadership after the expiration of a certain deadline. The Communists ignored this insistent advice from the head of state, although rumors of Zyuganov's looming resignation invariably make headlines on the eve of all CPRF congresses. Despite heated debates inside the party among the hardliners and the moderates at the congress Gennady Zyuganov continues to suit all. Moreover, he said he had no intention of looking for successors. Four years ago it looked like the CPRF was about to split up. Businessman Gennady Semigin they laid claim to the position of Russia's top Communist (today he leads the Patriots of Russia party). Now, despite the several conflicts in the regional chapters and the obvious standoff between Zyuganov's two deputies - Ivan Melnikov and Vladimir Kashin - the general feeling is there is no alternative to Zyuganov inside the CPRF. The congress elected Zyuganov's third deputy - 39-year-old Dmitry Novikov, a State Duma member from the Amur Region, as the Central Committee's secretary for ideology. This does not mean, though, that Novikov may take Zyuganov's place some day, a source in the Central Committee is quoted by the daily Vedomosti as saying. The emergence of the new post is merely expected to 'water down' the influence of the two other deputies. In the Liberal Democrat Party the situation is quite different. Immediately after President Medvedev's statement the party's leader since the moment it was founded, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, declared "it's time for the old-timers - Zyuganov and myself - to go." Nezavisimaya Gazeta quotes some political analysts as saying Zhirinovsky may be succeeded by State Duma member, Andrei Lugovoi, whom the British authorities see as a suspected accomplice in the death of former federal security service FSB Colonel Alexander Litvinenko. An upsurge in political activity has been observed on both the left- and right-hand-side of the political spectrum. The liberals have hurried to form the Right Cause party, and at the other end, a Left Front has been emerging almost as fast. "This synchronicity makes one think the idea of the Right Cause and the Left Front was injected from above. As far as the Right Cause is concerned, nobody made any secret that was really so. When it comes to the Left Front, though, the affair looks not as simple as that," the weekly Argumenty Nedeli quotes the general director of the political information center, Alexei Mukhin, as saying. "The game is to be far more subtle and delicate. The electorate that is expected to follow the Left Front is unlikely to forgive their leaders even the slightest hints of connections with the Kremlin." That the Right Cause is the Kremlin's project has been recognized even by the leaders of the newly-founded party. On the ruins of the right-wing forces union SPS - at a certain point more or less influential liberal party that failed to enter parliament in the previous two elections - and two other far less significant right-of-center organizations - there has emerged a right-of-center party that may contest seats in parliament. Right Cause co-chairman, former SPS leader Leonid Gozman acknowledged that the party was being created in cooperation with the presidential staff, which he described as "a shame and disgrace." At the same time he argued "there is a chance the party may be independent."
Secondly, the sole alternative to that was "political oblivion." The whole nation was a witness to the emergence of the Right Cause - the ceremony was telecast on the federal channels at prime-time. In contrast to this, the creation of the Left Front was enveloped in a veil of secrecy. Among the Left Front's activists one finds Ilya Ponomarev, a rather active member of the Just Russia (sometimes translated as Fair Russia) party some still regard as a second ruling party, Sergei Udaltsov, the leader of the Vanguard of Red Youth, Geidar Dzhemal, a philosopher and leader of the Islamic Community, Alexei Prigarin, of the phantom-like RCP-CPSU (Russian Communist Party-Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and others. Part of Eduard Limonov's banned rebel National Bolshevik Party and Labor Russia activists are said to have joined in. "This is a rag of many colors, so there are no chances of creating an ideologically homogenous organization at all. Consequently, it will need some sort of outside management," says Alexei Mukhin. Apparently, the Left Front was set up as a floor for non-parliamentary associations that have experienced the electorate's growing interest against the backdrop of the financial crisis." The Left Front is to cooperate with the trade unions, which have ever more often staged street protests. The end purpose is put protest activities onto a track where they can be controlled by the authorities. The fragments of militant youth groups and politicians form the Yabloko party and the SPS remaining outside the right cause have been eyeing each other with attention. They may team up sometime later this month for a political project bearing the working name Solidarity.
Inside that future liberal opposition coalition one may find the leader of the St. Petersburg's Yabloko chapter, Ilya Yashin, former SPS co-leaders Nikita Belykh and Boris Nemtsov, leader of the United Civil Front Garry Kasparov, human rights activists Lev Ponomarev and others. "The Kremlin will certainly keep an eye on the creation and development of the new political structures, and it will be keen to prevent a repetition of the Georgian or Ukrainian scenarios of democratic reforms in Russia," Mukhin said with certainty. Unrighteous Cause: In Destroying the Opposition, is the Kremlin Wrecking the State? December 10, 2008, (Moskovskii Komsomolets) - Nikita Belykh, then deputy governor of Perm, was recruited in 2004 to head the Union of Right Forces (SPS) party. Belykh has never been a colorful or charismatic politician. Anatoly Chubais was always regarded as the real boss in the SPS. Before the party ceased to exist, close associates of its last "leader" described Belykh along the following lines: "Easily led, incapable of making decisions, overly inclined to compromise, tries to make everyone like him, lacks any real leadership ambitions." For all his defects, however, Belykh was and is an intelligent, competent, and fairly principled politician. The Kremlin has now decided that such people don't belong in the opposition. The reasoning used by the presidential administration is readily apparent: since the economic crisis is sure to reduce the popularity of the authorities and cause widespread social discontent, the best means of defense is attack, so the opposition should be weakened ahead of time. All competent politicians should be knocked out of the opposition's ranks. For all its outward appeal, however, such a line of reasoning is deeply flawed. The opposition, the public, and even the authorities themselves are being cornered, in effect. Some citizens hold right-wing or pro-democracy views; where can they look, if they no longer have confidence in current leaders? Can they find any competent opposition figures? There are none: all of them have either been marginalized or recruited by the authorities. Can they support the new Kremlin-created right-wing party? But that would mean abandoning self-respect. After all, it's a total con: scratch the Right Cause (Pravoye Delo) party, and you'll find United Russia. So the only remaining option for citizens with right-wing views is supporting the "pro-democracy extremists" such as Garry Kasparov. In trying to "smooth out" the field of Russian politics as much as possible, the Kremlin is actually radicalizing it. By the way, the fact that Belykh has been sent off to Vyatka (Kirov) is rather symbolic. To quote Boris Nemtsov's acerbic comment: "Talented people used to be exiled into agriculture. Now they're sent to Kirov." Ever since the days of Communist Governor Sergeyenkov, the Kirov region has been considered a "depressed region." Not even the appointed governor, Nikolai Sheklein, was able to change this situation. Sheklein's dismissal has been predicted since early 2008. Presumably, there won't be any problems with appointing a new governor. The United Russia party holds an absolute majority in the Kirov regional legislature (36 out of 54 seats), so support for the Kremlin's creature is guaranteed. True, the region's residents remain fairly conservative; the Kirov region was part of the pro-Communist Red Belt until 2000. And the governor's democratic innovations, if any, will be accepted by residents with some difficulty. Translated by InterContact Communist leader says Russia may see social unrest like Greece Moscow, 15 December (Interfax) - Chairman of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) believes that protests similar to those that took place in Greece are possible in Russia. "Is it possible in Russia? Yes it is. There is a great deal of accumulated social disaffection," Zyuganov told a news conference at the Interfax central office on Monday (15 December). He expressed the view that the main reasons for the protests in Greece were social, and wondered why Russian television focused on anarchists when covering the events there. "It is a very superficial, totally wrong approach," Zyuganov said. The Communist leader listed several reasons which, he believes, might cause disaffection among the people of Russia. In particular, he believes that a mass dismissal of officers from the army is wrong. Furthermore, Zyuganov fears the consequences of the coming cold winter; he gave the example of Yakutia, where temperatures have dropped below (minus) 50. Among other possible reasons, the CPRF leader listed the low level of various welfare benefits and the fact that Russian peasants could not sell their produce. He also drew attention to the upcoming rise in communal services charges. "From 1 January, communal payments rise by 25 per cent, and that in the country where 55 million people live on R5,000-8,000 (a month; 180-290 dollars at the current rate of exchange) on average. In (President Dmitriy Medvedev's shoes, I would have said that we cannot raise (the charges). By doing this, they are creating a completely explosive, unmanageable situation. Not a single reasonably well thought-out and competent decision!" Zyuganov said. (Russian state news agency RIA Novosti, in Russian, 1029 gmt 15 Dec 08, quoted deputy chairman of the CPRF central committee Vladimir Kashin as saying that the party believes that natural resources should be nationalized and state control over such sectors as the railways, agriculture and power engineering should be introduced to avert further economic troubles.)
Communists Slam Ongoing Military Reform MOSCOW. Dec 10 (Interfax-AVN) - The Russian Communist Party has harshly criticized the ongoing military reform in Russia by describing it as the most destructive since the times of Peter the Great and demanded that Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov be dismissed. "This reform is likely to become the most destructive in the three centuries since Peter the Great set up a regular Russian army. While our army became stronger after going through the severest Great Patriotic War, it could lose its capacity to defend Russia as a result of Serdyukov's reform being pursued in peacetime,"
the Communist Party said in a statement on Tuesday. The reform is entering the practical phase, the statement said. "The command structures of the armed forces are seeing mass discharges of servicemen and their replacement by civilians, and directives have been issued to close down dozens of military educational colleges and the liquidation of hundreds of military units," it said. The Communist Party believes the reform could deal an especially painful blow to "the officer corps, which is planned to be replaced by sergeants or even civilians," the statement says. "This is nothing but the blind destruction of the country's complicated defense system, whose core is the officer corps," it says. "The liquidation of military colleges and academies ruins the country's very ability to produce reliable officer personnel," it says. The comprehensive decisions on reform in the armed forces "were made by a narrow group of people without sufficient knowledge of military issues, who did not discuss it with military specialists or even with the parliament," it said. "The government and the defense minister have not proposed a comprehensive plan of social support of the servicemen to be discharged and members of their families or of their retraining in civilian professions and employment," it said. Therefore, the Communist Party "strongly condemns the planned reforms and demands that they be stopped and thoroughly discussed at the parliament and with military specialists," it said. "The Communist Party's faction at the State Duma insists on the urgent discussion of the beginning military 'reform' at a parliamentary session, with the prime minister and the defense minister invited," it said. "Considering the extremely negative atmosphere that has formed in the Russian armed forces because of Mr. Serdyukov and the threat of the weakening of Russia's security caused by his actions," the Communist Party demands his dismissal, it said. The Communist Party supports a nationwide protest action against the destruction of the armed forces and calls on its activists and supporters to take part in it, the statement says.
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