James Goldgeier is professor of political science and international politics at George Washington University. In this interview, which was conducted by Washington Profile, he assesses current geopolitical trends affecting Russian, EU, and American relations with eachother.
Originally printed as "The Strategic Triangle: Russia, the U.S. and Europe" in Washington Profile, on April 2, 2006.
Washington Profile: You have studied the leadership and foreign policy styles of Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev …. Do you see any parallels between Putin’s personality and politics and those of past Soviet leaders? Who does he most remind you of?
Goldgeier: …I don’t think there is any direct analogy with any of them. Clearly he is someone for whom control is one of the most important things to him. One of the hallmarks of his presidency will be his effort to try and have as much control as possible over the nature of political, and one could even argue, over economic life, although that’s a little more difficult. But I don’t know that there is a direct analogy with any of them. I would just say that two of the features that strongly mark him are one, the real obsession with control, and two, which is sort of going against the first, seeming indecision: It seems as though the policies that he produces aren’t always the most coherent ones.
Washington Profile: There is a common perception in Russia that the United States foreign policy has done nothing but try to undermine and weaken Russia …. How would you evaluate U.S. policy toward Russia since the end of the Cold War?
Goldgeier: I really don’t believe, and I know it’s hard for a lot of people to accept because they see the outcomes of the policies and they see what happened in the 1990’s… I just really do not believe that the United States set out in any deliberate fashion to undermine Russia. If you look first at the George H.W. Bush administration, he wasn’t really in office long enough with the new independent Russia: it was just a one year overlap in 1992. The Clinton administration had eight years, and really did, I believe, want to see Russia succeed. I certainly think President Clinton believed that, and wanted Russia to develop democracy and market economy. But at the same time, the U.S. had a number of foreign policy interests in the surrounding region and elsewhere in Europe that they were able to pursue because Russia was so weak… With this administration, it’s very different. In the 1990’s you had an effort to provide economic assistance, and that’s been so criticized, because of the problems that Russia had in the 1990s. I don’t think that’s because the United States deliberately sought to undermine, I think it’s just the fact that the policies weren’t particularly effective, the money wasn’t particularly well spent, the ideas behind either weren’t good ones themselves, or they weren’t implemented very well. So I think its more of a question of not being very effective, as opposed to any kind of deliberate strategy of undermining. And in this administration, the economic assistance isn’t really an issue anymore, because Russia doesn’t need economic assistance. In terms of this administration’s approach, it’s basically just to try to hope that it could do business in Russia where it needs to, and not really worry about the rest. There is really very little of substance that the United States and Russia pursue with one another today.
Washington Profile: And what about the next U.S. administration?
Goldgeier: It depends on what happens in the Russian elections in 2008. I think if we see Russia going the same way it is going now for the foreseeable future, and we see a new president in Russia that isn’t that much different from the current president, then I don’t think there will be much difference in U.S. policy, no matter who wins. I think it will be largely continuity. Because right now, again, it’s really a policy of doing business with Russia where it can, saying some critical things, but not too much, really it’s not a central relationship for American foreign policy. Now if there is new leadership in the Kremlin and that new leadership is looking to play a different kind of role in world affairs, or from an American stand point especially, playing a more constructive role in certain areas of the former Soviet Union, wanting to for example resolve some of the conflicts related to Moldova and Georgia for example, if there were that kind of initiative coming from the Russian side, then I think that would make a difference on the American side. But I would predict continuity more than change.
Washington Profile: If one examines Russian foreign policy in the same time period, one notices a tendency to form coalitions and alliances with India, China, at times with Europe, and now possibly with Iran - in an attempt to counterbalance the United States…. What have been the results of these efforts and what have been the consequences in terms of international security?
Goldgeier: I don’t think there is much of a larger impact. If you look at them, yes, I do believe that Russia has tried to pursue policies, for example, the recent invitation of Hamas to Moscow, to put it to the Americans a little bit, especially after all that we saw in the 1990’s. But I think in terms of the broader impact, on Iraq, the decision to oppose the war is now a minor issue for the United States. The U.S. is desperately trying to figure out a policy that would enable it to succeed in Iraq, so the Russian part of that isn’t as central as just the American effort to figure out how to get it right. On Iran, Russia has put out its proposal as part of the effort to try to get the Iranians to stop pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and I think that if the Iranians were willing to accept the deal and try to move forward that would be a benefit to everyone, so in that sense, so far at least, the Russians have been contributing to some international efforts to resolve the problem. In terms of the overall impact of the Russian moves: I don’t think they’ve been very great. If you look at other areas, where we’ve had differences, for example, on Ukraine, it certainly didn’t affect the outcome of the Ukrainian elections in 2004, and whether or not we see a really different Ukrainian policy after this election this month remains to be seen.
Washington Profile: What do you believe to be Putin’s biggest foreign policy mistake?
Goldgeier: I think the biggest foreign policy mistake was probably the effort to try to get the fraudulent outcome in the Ukrainian elections in December 2004, and not just because it was so badly done, but it so revealed Putin’s attitude toward Russia’s neighbors, the effort to try to stop these kinds of democratic movements in countries. And really, I think made the rest of the world aware of what Putin was up to. YUKOS had been a big deal, but I don’t think people had focused on some of the policies that Russia was pursuing. I think the Ukrainian elections did that. Now the other big mistake was the way the energy supply to Ukraine was handled this winter. That has made the Europeans incredibly nervous in a way that nothing else has about the dependability of the Russian government.
Washington Profile: Europe has been regarded by many as the geographical, and at times, political middle between the United States and Russia…. What is Europe’s role now, in terms of U.S. Russia relations?
Goldgeier: What’s most interesting will really be the policies of the German government under the new Chancellor because I think Shroeder’s problem of playing a kind of role like that was that he had a terrible relationship with President Bush. The question for Merkel will be, since she will have a great relationship with President Bush, will she have a good enough relationship with President Putin, that she could potentially play this role….
Well I think that certainly, as Russia continues to grow economically, which by all accounts that’s just going to continue now for at least as far as we can see right now, and the relationship between the E.U. and Russia will continue to strengthen economically, so that’s going to be incredibly important to all sides. I guess potential flashpoints will come partly about whether the E.U. develops a strategy for trying to include Ukraine more seriously on a track for membership and also on what happens in Belarus. It really all depends on what happens in Belarus. If Belarus ended up over some period of time having more of what happened in Ukraine then the E.U. and Russia might find themselves having a different perspective on that. But I think in terms of the economic area, I think they both have such a deep stake in it, that they will continue to pursue that.
Washington Profile: Do you think it plausible that Russia could ever become an E.U. member?
Goldgeier: I don’t think that would ever happen. Of course, then again, one never knows… 100 years, 200 years from now… The E.U. is having enough trouble now governing itself as large as it is, it has a big potential new member 10-15 years from now, in Turkey, and it could potentially be in the same time frame that you see Ukraine come in. Those are really two big countries for the E.U. to incorporate. From the E.U. side just the thought of trying to integrate Russia is just too much, and Russia doesn't seem particularly interested in that type of integration anyway, at least, under the current government. I really just don’t see that in the cards.
Washington Profile: How would you evaluate the U.S. position on EU enlargement?
Goldgeier: Well I think the U.S. should want the E.U. to continue to enlarge. The United States has wanted the enlargement of both NATO and the E.U. in order to serve as institutions that could help develop broader stability in Europe, so the United States policy has been to encourage the E.U. to take Turkey in as a member, I think the U.S. looks at both NATO and the E.U. as important for the future of the Balkans and I think the U.S. will want the EU and NATO to reach out to include Ukraine. So I think the U.S. has had a policy of wanting this to continue and I think it should want it to continue.
Washington Profile: Does the U.S. consider the E.U. a competitor or a threat to some extent?
Goldgeier: On economic grounds, there is certainly competition between the United States and Europe, but in a market setting, that is presumably healthy, and also, if any problems arise that can always be worked out through the WTO. On the security front no, the U.S. looks at Europe and realizes that it doesn’t have the will or desire to spend more on military matters, so Europe’s not going to develop as a military threat.
Washington Profile: What do you think Russia will accomplish if anything with its G8 presidency?
Goldgeier: Certainly what the Russians, what Putin, will want most out of the meeting is that the other seven show up and make it a successful meeting, and that from Russia’s standpoint would be very valuable if that’s what takes place. The biggest potential problems for Russia are the following. One, that they’ll be huge numbers of journalists in St. Petersburg for the meetings who will be writing stories about what’s going on, and the obvious story that they will focus on is the question of “how can this country that is moving in a non democratic direction be a member of the G8, and hosting the G8?” So that kind of attention could prove to be embarrassing.
And the other one is the main issue that Putin wanted to raise which was the security issue. The real question is, do the other countries feel that there is energy security? Energy security to the other members of the G8 is Russia as a supplier of oil and gas that helps diversify away from other sources, and that the other members can count on that supply. That is why the issue in the winter with Ukraine was such a big deal, because that was energy insecurity, and to make this a success, Putin has to be very clear that Russia’s role as an energy supplier is in fact a major plus for everybody else, and not a potential weapon that Russia could use.
Washington Profile: And how might he be able to accomplish that?
Goldgeier: The thing about these kinds of meetings is that leaders are never really looking to embarrass each other, they go to these summits and they want everybody to be happy. It’s just hard to imagine that if all these leaders show up for this summit in St. Petersburg, and you know there are a lot of calls that they shouldn’t go and so on, I think that’s very hard to do. Once they are there, even if they are trying to be a little critical and maybe have some other meetings that show that they are concerned about certain things that are going in Russia. At the end of the day, leaders in that kind of setting don’t really want to embarrass each other, so in all likelihood, at least from the standpoint of the other leaders, Putin will be fine. The real question is whether or not he can control the kind of story that the foreign media is looking for and I think they’ll be looking at stories about their lack of democracy, which will be potentially embarrassing for him that there is so much focus on that.
Washington Profile: How do you think the West will react if Putin decides to stay on or if the elections are not free? How, if at all, will it affect Russian-Western relations?
Goldgeier: I think there would be a huge reassessment if Putin tried to change the constitution and stay on. I think that would be a serious blow for relations between the West and Russia, especially because he’s said so many times that he intends to follow the constitution and step down. So then the next question is what kind of elections they will be, and I think that the West will be trying ahead of time to show that they have every expectation that these are going to be free and fair elections. If they were really seriously flawed, I think there would be a lot of criticism, but probably from the standpoint of the West’s reaction, since it can always be sort of fudged and there can always be disagreement about sort of what really happened, as long as there is a new president, everybody probably would be satisfied, that the system moved on. But it would be a lot harder for the West to explain to their publics if Putin tried to stay on.
Washington Profile: If things continue to develop as they are now what will relations between Russia, the U.S. and Europe look like in 10-15 years?
Goldgeier: At this point, projecting out, it’s largely a business relationship, and the political side of it is pretty devoid of anything major. If we had to project out from today, we’d have to expect simply a continuation of the strengthening of the business relationship, and not really much more than that. A lot is going to depend on how Russia evolves politically and also what happens in terms of future EU enlargement in the former Soviet Union. I don't expect either the EU or Russia to pursue EU membership for Russia. But in 10-15 years, one can imagine that Ukraine would be a member.
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