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VESTNIK, THE JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN AND ASIAN STUDIES  / FRIENDSHIP OF THE PEOPLES POLICY AND THE 1937 KORYO SARAM DEPORTATION
15.04.2015


Isabel Kim Dzitac obtained a BA in History at the University of British Columbia and is currently completing an MA/MSc in International and World History at Columbia University and the London School of Economics. She aspires to earn a PhD in History and become a Professor of History.[1]

This paper was published as part of Vestnik: The Journal of Russian and Asian Studies.  


 

De Jure and De Facto:
An Examination of the
“Friendship of the Peoples” Policy
and the 1937 Koryo Saram[2] Deportation

By Isabel Kim Dzitac

Even though we have lived in harsh conditions
we the community of Koryo Saram[3]
have helped each other like brothers.
We have provided each other hope and aid.
Even when it came to our last piece of bread, we shared and ate together.[4]
–Yang Won-shik[5]

In December 1935, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, introduced a new policy: “Friendship of the Peoples.” This policy–which stemmed from an earlier 1929 Soviet campaign that promoted Brotherhood of the Peoples (bratstvo narodov ( ))[6]–aimed to consolidate Soviet identity by embracing both Russian and non-Russian ethnic groups within the Soviet socialist state. Roughly two years later, on August 21, 1937, Stalin and the Chairman of the Council of the People’s Commisars, Vyacheslav Molotov, agreed upon a new resolution. Unlike the 1935 notion of inclusion, Stalin’s 1937 proposal was devised to deport the Korean population residing in the Russian Far East (often referred to collectively as “Koryo Saram”) to areas primarily within Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.[7] Stalin and Molotov’s decision to “cleanse” the region was justified by claims that the Koryo Saram, which then numbered about 180,000 people, [8] were “dangerous” to the security and well-being of the Soviet Union. The Soviets believed they were providing cover, directly or indirectly, for Japanese spies.[9] Yet, there is a clear contradiction between the 1937 deportation and the 1935 notion of friendship: namely, deporting the unfavourable Koryo Saram to Central Asia countered the idea that the Central Asian peoples were considered “friends” of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).[10] This shift from placing the Friendship of the Peoples at the heart of the party’s ideological agenda[11] towards executing a collective, ethnic-based punishment for perceived offences initiated the first major ethnic-based deportation.

The Friendship of the Peoples and the deportation of the Koryo Saram have been examined by scholars, albeit in mutually exclusive manners. For instance, in her study of deportations to Tashkent, historian Rebecca Manley discusses the significance of the Friendship of the Peoples, yet glosses over the 1937 announcement to deport the Koryo Saram.[12] Similarly, while positing that the deportation of 1937 was a logical continuation of Soviet policymaking, historian German Kim conflates the significance of the Friendship of the Peoples policy.[13] By classifying the forced relocation and the Friendship of the Peoples as unrelated, both scholars present vitiated histories.

In order to render a more nuanced narrative, this paper probes the relevance of the Friendship of the Peoples to the 1937 deportation and examines the implications of Stalin’s decision-making for the Koryo Saram. In addressing these topics, this study contends that, although Stalin successfully removed all the Koryo Saram from the Russian Far East, his two-fold proposed aim of dismantling Koryo Saram unity and fostering friendship with Central Asian states proved to be a failure. For one, even though the notion of friendship was strategically leveraged and widely campaigned for, it was not adopted in practice to a comparable degree. Rather than reinforcing the notion of friendship, the 1937 deportation countered idealized Soviet campaigns of comradeship with Central Asians. Secondly, Stalin’s aim of deporting the Koryo Saram proved to be a failure because, rather than breaking the unity of the Koryo Saram, the hardships and challenges which the Koryo Saram faced during the latter half of the 1930s strengthened their sense of kinship and brotherhood.

I. Friendship of the Peoples and the Mirage of Inclusivity

Although the Brotherhood of the Peoples campaign did not promote Soviet unity in an identical manner as the Friendship of the Peoples, studies of both campaigns reveal how historians have made sense of Soviet policy making. Scholars have tended to agree that since the Soviet Union’s inception, the Soviets adopted the metaphor of “brotherhood” as a means of advocating proletarian unity within the nation.[14] Yet, unlike the Brotherhood of the Peoples policy, which played “a minor role in state efforts to promote Soviet unity,” the 1935 policy of friendship portrayed the Soviet Union as a multi-ethnic state.[15] With the exception of historian Terry Dean Martin—who claims that the brotherhood campaign functioned distinctly from the notion of friendship[16]— scholars have disregarded notable differences between these two policies. According to South Korean scholar Baek Tae Hyeon, histories “usually contain inaccurate accounts.”[17] In an attempt to elucidate the oversimplified depiction of the Friendship of the Peoples policy and its significance, it is crucial to probe how the notion of “friendship” was not only promoted, but also practiced by the Soviets.

In December 1935, the Kremlin hosted a gathering where Stalin and members of the Politburo met with Tajiks and Turkmen representatives. A particularly telling fact about this meeting is that Pravda, the official newspaper of the Communist Party, emphasized the Soviet leaders’ “considerate” and “hospitable” acts to the Central Asian peoples.[18] Instead of referencing the Tajiks and Turkmen by their ethnic designation, the newspaper reiterated how Molotov and Stalin addressed the Tajiks and Turkmen as “comrades.”[19] Despite positive portrayals of friendship during publicized events like the Politburo meeting, the adoption of the Friendship of the Peoples differed in actual practice. In order to illustrate how phraseology was imposed, but not adopted to a comparable degree, the rest of this paper will trace how the deportation of the Koryo Saram to Central Asia clashed with the notion of fostering friendship.

II. Overview of Migrations from the Korean Peninsula to the Russian Far East

The three migratory waves that took place during the early 1860s, late 1860s, and year of 1910 are important for understanding the influx of ethnically Korean[20] people to the Russian Far East. With the signing of the Treaty of Peking in 1860, Russia obtained lands that were in close geographic proximity to Korea. As scholars like Chey Y.C. contend, the availability of farmland fuelled the first notable Korean migration to Tsarist Russia in 1863.[21] The vast majority of Korean migrants conglomerated in villages like Sidimi, Tizinkhe, and Yanchikhe.[22] Unlike the Korean migration in 1863, the large-scale migration of 1869-1870 was precipitated by regional strife.[23] Experiencing famine and poor harvests, many Koreans searched abroad for a life that would yield better chances and opportunities. During this time, the Korean peoples settled in sparsely inhabited or uncultivated Russian land. By dwelling in areas that were not cultivated to the degree of exploitation, the Korean migrants played a vital role in providing labour, refashioning the agricultural sector, and revitalizing rural economic surplus for the Russian Far East.[24] Later, when Japan colonized the Korean Peninsula in 1910, many Koreans fled.[25]Although each of these migratory movements differed in intent and timing, “the migrants developed into a cohesive social group with their own traditions, establishing cultural institutions such as Korean newspapers and journals, a publishing house, radio programming and a theatre.”[26] As Carol Ember, Touraj Atabaki, and Sanjyot Mehendale suggest, by 1917, migrants from the earliest of migrations to the most recent one had found their niche within the Russian Far East–engaging in agricultural activity, fishing, and/or manual labour.[27] This pivotal role that the Korean migrants played in revitalizing regions in the Far East was viewed positively by the Tsarist Empire.[28]

III. Divergent Egalitarian Policies of Friendship

There were no punitive Soviet policies that distinguished foreign groups on the basis of ethnicity prior to the 1937 announcement. In fact, as Stephen M. Norris and Willard Sunderland contend, the implementation of inclusive policies marked the Soviet Union and its leaders as “champions of diversity.”[29] While Stalin generally opposed nationalist separatism and valued working-class unity,[30] the Soviets continued to prize the Koryo Saram for their contribution to the agricultural sector in the 1930s. In 1933, for instance, the Koryo Saram were awarded their own autonomous Korean National Region in the USSR. This appreciation for the Koryo Saram and the notion of a coexisting, multi-ethnic state existed as late as 1936. For instance, a February 1936 article from Pravda outlined how “all of them [the various ethnic minorities] from the smallest to the largest are equal Soviet patriots.”[31] Similarly, a December 1936 article commented how the Soviet Union was a “common home to the toilers of all nationalities.”[32] Despite the inclusion of various nationalities, as scholars like Atabaki and Mehendale claim, “it was all the more unexpected when in 1937 the entire Soviet Korean population was suddenly deported to Central Asia.”[33]

IV. Admiration to Animosity

In order to unravel how deportation came to be regarded as justifiable, it is important to consider it in the context of the time. With the emergence of the Great Terror in 1936 and a xenophobic tide that targeted “foreign” nations and nationalities as threats to the Soviet state, the Koryo Saram came to be viewed as a “problem.”[34] In contrast to the Friendship of the Peoples, which encouraged the adaptation and integration of the Koryo Saram,[35] in the case of the 1937 deportations, unity among the Koryo Saram worked against the minority’s favour. In a hierarchy of ethnic difference that favoured certain ethnic nationalities over others,[36] the Koryo Saram were classified by the Soviet state as part of the “enemy’s empire.”[37]

Contrary to Stalin’s remark during the December 1935 Politburo meeting that the Soviet state was “afraid of no one, neither internal nor external enemies,”[38] xenophobia was gradually growing in the USSR. Strained Japanese-Soviet tensions stemming from as early as the Russo-Japanese conflict of 1905 coupled with the 1937-1945 Asia-Pacific War (which would eventually become known as part of the Second World War) goaded a change from admiration of the Koryo Saram to animosity. With the implementation of assimilation (同化 [dōka]) policies like naisen ittai (내선일체, 内鮮 一體, ‘Japan and Korea are one’) or naisen dōjin (내선동인, 内鮮 同仁, ‘Japan and Korea under Impartial Benevolence’), the Japanese promoted affinity among the Asiatic people.[39] As field marshal of the Imperial Japanese Army, General Hata Shunroku reflected, “there is no distinction between the Army and the nation, as their component elements are the same. It would be a mistake to talk of the Army and the nation as though they were separate entities.”[40] In the context of “making imperial subjects” (皇民化 [kōminka]) during the War Mobilization Movement, Japanese newspaper articles bolstered the notion that ethnic Koreans were Japanese loyalists.[41] Portraying the Koryo Saram as Japanese collaborators, Governor-General Jirō Minami described how since “the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict, the Koreans generally have co-operated closely with the Japanese.”[42] Adding to the breadth of his argument, Minami reiterated how the Korean people take “pride in their Japanese nationality and the entire [Korean] peninsula is permeated with patriotic feeling, which finds expression in various [ways.]”[43] The publication of such articles intensified the notion that the Koryo Saram were collaborators of the Japanese empire.[44] This perception of the Koryo Saram, as Martin cogently delineates, “represented a final factor fuelling the Soviet turn toward primordial nationality.”[45]

When deportation was proposed, it was evident that both the Soviet Union’s notion of the Friendship of the Peoples and its view of the Koryo Saram had changed. Although Rebecca Manley posits that the Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish, and Belorussian migrations to Central Asia reinforced a stronger sense of friendship between Central Asia and the Soviet Union, she overlooks the significance of the Koryo Saram deportation in jeopardising the policy of friendship.[46] In contrast to the newspaper articles published during 1936 that promoted multi-ethnic inclusion, on August 18 1937 a draft proposal of Resolution 1428-326CC was sent to Far Eastern leaders that countered earlier notions of inclusivity. Entitled “On the Exile of the Korean Population from Border Raions of the Far East Kray,” the proposal declared that all Koreans were to be deported with the intent of both preventing the influx of Japanese spies and minimizing the potential threat that population concentration would pose.[47] In the resolution, Stalin and Molotov offered the Koryo Saram three deportation destinations: Japanese-ruled Manchukuo, colonial Korea, or Central Asia. Since the anti-Japanese sentiments that spurred the 1910 ethnic Korean migration persisted among most of the Koryo Saram, neither immigrating to Manchukuo nor resettling in Korea were viewed as favourable.[48] As Otto J. Pohl stresses, “it is not known how many Soviet Koreans chose the option of leaving the USSR for Korea or Manchuria, but it was evidently relatively few.”[49]

V. The Role of Propaganda in Legitimizing Ethnic-Korean Deportations

Regardless of their earlier contributions to the Soviet Union, the Koryo Saram were collectively targeted as an untrustworthy ethnic minority that would endanger the Soviet people.[50] Propaganda played a particularly decisive role in advancing the ideals of the Soviet state. In his examination of the Koryo Saram, Nikolaĭ Fedorovich Bugaĭ asserts that there was no data on anti-Soviet activities that could have encouraged the Soviets to deport the Koryo Saram.[51] In an official 1937 Soviet Report, the first Secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, Lavrentiy Beria, described how “the USSR NKVD considers that there is no need at the present time to deport special deportees from the frontier strip.”[52] Although there was no evidence that the Koryo Saram were Japanese spies, Pravda continued to accuse them of disloyalty. Dichotomizing patriots on the one hand from traitors on the other, articles published from April 16 to 23 1937 stressed that “Japanese spies were active in Korea, China, Manchuria, and the Soviet Union, and were supposedly using Chinese and Koreans pretending to be locals.”[53] Whereas in 1933 the Koryo Saram were awarded their own region, in 1937, as German Kim notes, the Koryo Saram’s “tendency to settle in compact areas where they comprised a majority or substantial minority of the population conflicted” with the Soviet ideal of uniting native minorities and excluding foreign groups.[54]

Not only did propaganda galvanize anti-Korean sentiments, it also bolstered a sense of native Soviet patriotism. In order to further legitimize deportation, the press drew parallels to other groups like the Jews who were remembered for instigating distress to the Soviet state.[55] Newspapers circulated in 1937 also depicted native Soviet actors as loyal compatriots. They stressed that these Soviet figures not only held the inner communist infrastructure in place but also advanced the well-being of the union.[56] Although excluding the Koryo Saram countered the notion of the Friendship of the Peoples, with the dissemination of editorials contending that the Koryo Saram would threaten the Soviet state, the choice to deport the entire community came to be “greatly desired by the chauvinistic local non-Asiatic population as well as by local administrators and high government leaders.”[57]

VI. The Methods of Deportation and Purges

Within two months of the deportation’s inception on September 28 1937, all of the Koryo Saram in the Far East were relocated to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.[58] The methodical organization of the purging scheme and deportation system reiterates the great importance the Soviets attributed to the need to quickly “cleanse”[59] itself of any potential threat. Recently declassified archival sources expose how “in 1937, during the purges, 70 per cent of Korean intellectuals were allegedly removed and killed.”[60] Approximately 180,000 Koryo Saram were removed from the area over the span of just two months.[61]

Recent access to additional previously disclosed materials has prompted scholars to delve more deeply into how the deportations were planned and executed. In a recent publication, German Kim describes how “each [train] convoy consisted of 50 cars for people; one first-class car for the head of the convoy, KGB agents, and other officials accompanying the convoy; one car with sanitary facilities; one kitchen car; five or six covered wagons and two open-platform cars.”[62] Based on eyewitness accounts, Kim also reconstructs how the involvement of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) kept the system well-guarded and made escape virtually impossible.[63] He adds that, in a span of thirty to forty days, one car could transport five or six families (25-30 people) from the Far Eastern region to Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan.[64] While the train was created with a wide range of intended uses, each section did not necessarily fulfil its labelled purpose. For instance, while a kitchen and sanitary facility existed, hunger and unclean living conditions abounded, suggesting that likely these facilities were intended largely for those doing the transporting rather than those being transported. As one deportee, Yohn Song-Nyong recollects decades after the deportation, “during the span of one to two months you cannot imagine how many elders and children died [during the deportation process]...parents held their dead children in their arms and not knowing where they would be destined to and what their future would be like were stained with the blood of their children.”[65]

VII. The Koryo Saram’s Resurgence as a Cohesive Community

Although the proposal to deport the Koryo Saram to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was implemented based on the hope that disintegrating unity would “stop [the] penetration of Japanese spies into the area,”[66] the Koryo Saram did not remain entirely bound by the Soviet ideal.[67] For instance, the recreation of Korean language schools in early 1938 increased contact among the Koryo Saram.[68] In addition to schools teaching in Korean, the introduction of kobonji (고본지)a self-supporting Korean farming system–countered the aim of reducing concentration among the Korean peoples. Like the schools, this form of farming encouraged interaction among the Koryo Saram, albeit in a different space. In his discussion, Baek contends that “it is virtually impossible to have a full picture of Koryo Saram life in Central Asia without understanding the extent by which kobonji shaped the peoples since 1937.”[69] According to Baek, the kobonji system played a vital role in providing economic support for the deportees’ survival.[70] Even though little research has been conducted on the topic,[71] scholars have acknowledged how kobonji embraced the idea of communal farming based on ethnic solidarity.[72] While national cultures apart from the nationalist Soviet one were viewed less favourably,[73] the creation of the schools and the establishment of kobonji reveal how the Koryo Saram were able to reunite despite catastrophe, loss, and oppression.  

VIII. Koryo Saram Unity and the Failure of “The Friendship of the Peoples”

Despite promoting the Friendship of the Peoples since 1935, Stalin failed to abide by the spirit of his own policy. Since the resolution to deport the Koryo Saram was based on the idea that deportation would prevent the spread and collective grouping of potential Japanese spies, it was logical and convenient, from Stalin’s standpoint, to dismantle Koryo Saram unity in Central Asia. Yet, by deporting the Koryo Saram to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Stalin not only failed to demonstrate the friendship policy but, by deporting the supposed Japanese spies to these regions, also, theoretically jeopardized the safety and well-being of the Central Asian peoples. While the Koryo Saram did not, in fact, endanger the Central Asian peoples, the deportation symbolized a two-fold failure of the Soviets to pursue a genuine friendship with Central Asians and obliterate unity among the Koryo Saram.[74]

IX. Conclusion

The fear of unwanted nationalities eventually extended to other ethnic groups; however, the deportation of the Koryo Saram was the first ethnic deportation in the Soviet Union. It was only starting in 1954—17 years after the first deportation—that the Koryo Saram were reoffered citizenship.[75] Some scholars contend that, unlike other deported peoples, the Koryo Saram “were scrutinized all the way to Kazakhstan and Central Asia and even afterwards.”[76] This history of the deportations and its legacies[77] invariably influenced the Koryo Saram on both an individual and collective level.[78] Koryo Saram like Yohn Song Nyong or Yang Won-shik were affected by their experiences during the deportation and its repercussions. Yet despite such hardship, the Koryo Saram were able to sustain a strong sense of solidarity among themselves through the creation of language schools and communal farming practices.[79] In the present, over three hundred thousand Koryo Saram reside in Central Asia.[80] It is these resilient people who, according to Oka Natusko and Yalcin, have become “one of the strongest ethnic minorities”[81] and “most successful of the minority groups” in Central Asia. [82]

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Footnotes

[1] The author of this paper would like to sincerely thank the editors of the journal for their useful suggestions throughout the editing process.

[2] The term Koryo Saram (고려사람) literally means people (saram 사람) of the koryo (koryo 고려 dynasty). Koryo Saram is the most prominent term that is used to refer to the ethnically Korean population that primarily resides in Central Asia. Cf., for example, Kerŭman Kim, Na nŭn Koryŏ Saram ida 나는 고려사람이다 [I am a Koryo Saram] (Seoul: Kukhak Charyowŏn, 2013). Some individuals, however, interchangeably reference the Koryo Saram as ‘Soviet Koreans.’ Cf. Y.C. Chey “Soviet Koreans and Their Culture in the USSR,” in Koreans in the Soviet Union ed. D.S Suh (Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies, 1987); Michael Gelb, “An Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation: The Far-Eastern Koreans” The Russian Review 54.3 (July 1995); Valeriy S. Khan, “The Korean Minority in Central Asia: National Revival and Problem of Identity” International Journal of Central Asian Studies 3 (1998); Stephen M. Norris and Willard Sunderland, Russia's People of Empire: Life Stories from Eurasia, 1500 to the Present (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012).

[3] Here, Yang Won-shik explicitly chose to refer to himself and his compatriots as “Koryo Saram.” In some cases, however, it is not clear whether an individual considered him/herself or his/her community “Koryo Saram.” I am cognizant of an individual’s choice to identify her/himself as Koryo Saram, Soviet Korean, or neither. For the purposes of clarity and consistency, I refer to the Korean community residing in Central Asia as Koryo Saram throughout this paper.

[4] All primary and secondary source translations were done by Isabel Kim Dzitac. For transcriptions, I have used the McCune-Reischauer Romanization system for Korean and the the Hepburn Romanization for Japanese. However, exceptions exist (for example, individuals who spell their name differently). I have made an effort to preserve as much as possible the format and style of the original works. Any inaccuracies and errors are my own.

[5] Yang Won-Shik, “Our Living Conditions: Part One,” in Adaptation and Scented Language: Yang Won-Shik’s World of Poetry, ed. Hong Yong-hee (Seoul: Kukhak Charyowŏn, 2010), 94.

[6] Terry Dean Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (New York: Cornell, 2001), 432.

[7] Ibid.

[8] The estimate of Koryo Saram deportees differs among historians. For example, Steven Sunwoo Lee claims that there were approximately 180,000 whereas Julian Ross Paul King and German Kim assert that there were 170,000. I have chosen 180,000 because this is the most recent estimate that was made by Steven Sunwoo Lee in his 2008 PhD dissertation. For more information please see, Steven Sunwoo Lee, “Multiculturalism Versus ‘multi-national-ness’: The Clash of American and Soviet Models of Difference” (PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 2008).

[9] Both terms–“dangerous” and “cleanse”– were utilized by Pravda. For example, please see Terry Dean Martin, op. cit. 432.

[10] As mentioned above, two main destination locations of these deportations were Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan was granted SSR status in 1924 and Kazakhstan was granted SSR status in 1936.

[11] David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 45.

[12] Rebecca Manley, To the Tashkent Station: Evacuation and Survival in the Soviet Union at War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 220.

[13] German N. Kim, “The Deportation of 1937 as a Logical Continuation of Tsarist and Soviet Nationality Policy in the Russian Far East,” in Korean Diaspora: Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and North America, ed. Koh Hesung Chun (New Haven: East Rock Institute, 2008), R19-R44.

[14] Joshua Sanborn, “Family, Fraternity, and Nation-Building in Russia, 1905-1925,” in A State of Nations Empire and Nation-making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 93-110.

[15] Terry Dean Martin op. cit. 433.

[16] Terry Dean Martin claims that the brotherhood campaign “was propagandistic and symbolic.” Please see Ibid.

[17] Baek Tae Hyeon, “The Social Reality Faced by Ethnic Koreans in Central Asia,” in Korean Diaspora: Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and North America, ed. Koh Hesung Chun (New Haven: East Rock Institute, 2008), R62.

[18] “Na Soveshchanii v Kremle” [At the Conference in the Kremlin], Pravda no. 334 (December 5 1935): 1.

[19] Ibid, 3.

[20] In this paragraph, the term ‘Korean’ is used to denote the individuals—all of whom are ethnically , Chosŏn — who migrated from the Korean peninsula to the Russian Far East.

[21] Chey Y.C., “Soviet Koreans and Their Culture in the USSR,” in Koreans in the Soviet Union, ed. Suh D.S (Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies, 1987), 62.

[22] Nikolaĭ Mikhaĭlovich Przheval’skiĭ, and E. Delmar Morgan, Mongolia, the Tangut Country, and the Solitudes of Northern Tibet, Being a Narrative of Three Years' Travel in Eastern High Asia (London: Gregg International Publishers, 1876), 20.

[23] Yoon In-Jin, “Migration and the Korean Diaspora: A Comparative Description of Five Cases,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38.3 (March 2012): 427-428.

[24] Touraj Atabaki and Sanjyot Mehendale, Central Asia and the Caucasus Transnationalism and Diaspora (London: Routledge, 2004), 36.

[25] Sheila Miyoshi Jager, Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea (London: Profile Books), 21.

[26] Carol R. Ember, Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum, 2004), 419.

[27] Touraj Atabaki and Sanjyot Mehendale, op. cit. 36.

[28] James Stuart Olson, Lee Brigance Pappas, and Nicholas Charles Pappas, An Ethnohistorical Dictionary of the Russian and Soviet Empires (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 393.

[29] Stephen M. Norris and Willard Sunderland. Russia’s People of Empire: Life Stories from Eurasia, 1500 to the Present (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 12.

[30] Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

[31] Peredovaia, “Rossiyskaya Sovetskaya Federativnaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika” [Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic], Pravda no. 31 (February 1, 1936): 1.

[32] I. Trainin “Suverenitet Soiuznykh Respublik” [Sovereignty of the Soviet Republic], Pravda, no. 348 (December 19, 1936): 2.

[33] Touraj Atabaki and Sanjyot Mehendale, op. cit. 36.

[34] Resolution 1428-326CC, 1937.

[35] Valeriy S. Khan, “Koreans in Soviet and Post-Soviet Central Asia: Adaptation, Social Status, and Achievements,” Diaspora Studies 5.2 (2011): 153-171.

[36] Stephen M. Norris and Willard Sunderland, op. cit. 12.

[37] Resul Yalcin, The Rebirth of Uzbekistan: Politics, Economy and Society in the Post-Soviet Era (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002), 120.

[38] Terry Dean Martin, op. cit. 439.

[39] For more, please see: “Excluding by Inclusion: Liminal Colonialism and Malleable Identities in Rural Colonial Korea during the Asia-Pacific War, 1937-1945,” in Asia and Africa Across Disciplinary and National Lines, ed. Kondo Nobuaki (Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2015). 

[40] “Unity in the Army,” Japan Chronicle (March 7, 1940), 275

[41] Resul Yalcin, op. cit. 121.

[42] “Patriotism in Korea: Governor General on Common Efforts with Japan,” Japan Chronicle (January 20, 1938): 81.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid, 122.

[45] Terry Dean Martin, op. cit. 450.

[46] Rebecca Manley, op. cit. 220.

[47] Ibid. Also Resolution 1428-326CC, 1937. Note that Molotov and Stalin’s definition of “Koreans” was based on ethnicity.

[48] Otto J. Pohl, Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), 11.

[49] Ibid, 12.

[50] Paul Stronski, Tashkent: Forging a Soviet City, 1930-1966 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 49.

[51] Nikolaĭ Fedorovich Bugaĭ, The Deportation of Peoples in the Soviet Union (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996).

[52] Lavrentiy Beriya, “State Archive of the Russian Federation,” in The Deportation of Peoples in the Soviet Union, ed. Nikolaĭ Fedorovich Bugaĭ (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), 24.

[53] German Kim, op. cit. R32.

[54] Ibid, R30.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid, R19.

[58] Kuromiya Hiroaki, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin's Great Terror in the 1930s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 126.

[59] Terry Dean Martin, op. cit.

[60] Resul Yalcin, op. cit. 122.

[61] Terry Dean Martin, op. cit.

[62] German Kim, op. cit. R33-34.

[63] Ibid, R35.

[64] Ibid, R34.

[65] Yohn Song-Nyong, Song of Happiness (Sasusui Publishing, 1993): 42-44.

[66] Resolution 1428-326CC, 1937.

[67] Ibid, 121.

[68] Yoon In-Jin, op. cit. 416.

[69] Tae-Hyeon Baek, op. cit. R61.

[70] Ibid, R61.

[71] Kwŏn Hŭi, and Valeriĭ Sergeevich Han, Chungang Asia Ch'owŏn ŭi Yurang Nongŏp: Ujŭbek'isŭt'an Koryŏ Saram ŭi Kobonji Yŏn'gu 중앙아시아 초원의 유랑 농업: 우즈베키스탄 고려사람의 고본지 연구[Central Asian Nomadic Grassland Farming: A Study of Uzbekistan Koryo Saram’s Kobonji], (Sŏngnam: Han'guk Chŏngsin Munhwa     Yŏn'guwŏn, 2004).

[72] Ibid, R64.

[73] Resul Yalcin, op. cit. 122.

[74] “Velikoe Bratstvo Svobodnykh Narodov” [Great Brotherhood of the Free Nation], Pravda no. 335 (December 6, 1935): 1.

[75] Yalcin describes how after 1922, the Koreans were granted the right to adopt Soviet citizenship. Yet, few peoples accepted it during this time (121). By 1954, the situation was different. As Yelcin states, "prospects for them in Uzbekistan [were] promising” (123). Please see, Resul Yalcin, op. cit. 121-123.

[76] German Kim, op. cit. R34.

[77] Resul Yalcin, op. cit. 123.

[78] Pak Ki-hyŏn, Koryŏ Saram Koryŏ Sahoe: Arŭmdapko Sŭlp'ŏttŏn 474-yŏn Kan ŭi Yŏksa Kirok. Ch'op'an 고려사람 고려사회: 아름답고 슬펐던 474년간의 역사기록 [Koryo Saram, Koryo Society: A Beautiful and Sad 474 years of Historical Recollection], (Seoul: Nŭl P'urŭn Sonamu, 2006).

[79] Yang Won-Shik, op. cit. 94.

[80] Valeriy S. Khan, “The Korean Minority in Central Asia: National Revival and Problem of Identity,” International Journal of Central Asian Studies 3 (1998): 66.

[81] Oka Natsuko, “The Korean Diaspora in Nationalizing Kazakhstan: Strategies for Survival as an Ethnic Minority,” in Korean Diaspora: Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and North America, ed. Koh Hesung Chun (New Haven: East Rock Institute, 2008), R89.

[82] Resul Yalcin, op. cit. 123.



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